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THE STRATEGIC BASIS OF PRINCIPLED BEHAVIOR.
A CRITIQUE OF THE INCOMMENSURABILITY THESIS
ERIC A. POSNERt
When my love swears that she is made of truth
I do believe her though I know she lies,
That she might think me some untutored youth
Unlearned in the world's false subtleties.
Thus vainly thinking that she thinks me young,
Although she knows my days are past the best,
Simply I credit her false-speaking tongue;
On both sides thus is simple truth suppressed.
But wherefore says she not she is unjust,
And wherefore say not I that I am old?
0, love's best habit is in seeming trust,
And age in love loves not to have years told.
Therefore I lie with her, and she with me,
And in our faults by lies we flattered be.
-- Shakespeare's Sonnet 138
INTRODUCTION
The incommensurability thesis holds that people cannot always
value options along a common metric that is normatively justified.
Most advocates of this thesis argue that people can choose among op-
tions, but that the choice depends on qualitative differences between
options that cannot be reduced to vectors on a single dimension of
evaluation.' The thesis, it should be noted, is not a theory of choice.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Matthew Adler, Richard
Craswell, Peter Huang, Lewis Komhauser, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein, and Sympo-
sium participants for very helpful comments.
'For modem discussions, see, for example, ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MoRALITY OF FREEDOM 321-66
(1986); Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1371 (1998); Ruth Chang, Introduction, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND
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Rather, it is a label attached to a social phenomenon: the tendency of
many people to refuse to make tradeoffs in everyday life that are said
to be demanded by the theory of rational choice. Because these re-
fusals are anomalies for rational choice theory, they are said to justify
rejection of that theory and its replacement with a superior theory of
choice. Conceived in this way, the incommensurability thesis justifies
a research program devoted to the discovery of a theory that unifies
our intuitions and observations about the choices people make.
It is a difficult question when and whether to abandon or modify
an old theory because it does not fully explain the phenomena it is
intended to explain. Usually, people do not abandon an old theory
until a better theory has presented itself. Although some advocates of
the incommensurability thesis have presented their own theories of
choice,2 these theories have little explanatory power. Right now,
then, the question is whether incommensurability poses a serious
enough challenge to rational choice tojustify either abandoning it or
modifying it. I want to make only a modest claim: One should not
reject rational choice theory because of its failure to explain incom-
mensurability without first exploring how rational choice theory
might deal with incommensurability. That is to say, does the incom-
mensurability thesis really identify anomalies in rational choice the-
ory?
I will argue that it does not.3 Although the incommensurability
thesis often describes people's representations about themselves, it does
not describe their actual behavior-that is, the choices they make in
everyday life-although their representations sometimes influence
their behavior. People rationally make incommensurability claims in
order to obtain strategic advantages in their interactions with others.
Incommensurability claims do not reflect people's interests and val-
ues; they conceal them.
The argument has two parts. First, I present a model in which
people take actions and make statements in the hope of acquiring a
valuable reputation for trustworthiness. In this model, false state-
can be found in GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY (Tom Bottomore &
David Frisby trans., 1978).
2 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 17 (describing an "expressive theory" of ra-
tional action).
" The same question is posed, but the opposite answer is given, in Richard Warner,
Impossible Comparisons and Rational Choice Theory, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1705 (1995)
(arguing that incommensurability lies behind behaviors, such as voting and coopera-
tion, that are said to be inexplicable under rational choice theory).
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ments about one's values emerge in equilibrium, and these false
statements have a common element: They take the form of princi-
ples. Whether or not people believe that they are principled, most
people will violate their principles when doing so serves their inter-
ests, even though they must and do publicly express their commit-
ment to those principles. Second, I argue that incommensurability
claims are a type of principled claim. Incommensurability claims
emerge in equilibrium even though people do not act consistently
with them and even though they do not express people's values. In-
commensurability is not so much a problem about values; it is a prob-
lem about social coordination and ideology. The Article concludes
with a discussion of the normative implications of the analysis, argu-
ing that incommensurability claims should have little weight in any
theory of social choice. As a positive matter, however, governments
must and do give weight to incommensurability claims.
To motivate intuitions, I set out some examples of incommensur-
ability, all taken from Sunstein
" A person cancels lunch with a friend and feels bad, but he could
not properly offer the friend $20 as compensation. Friendship and
money are not commensurable.
5
" An employer could offer an employee an extra $1000 to do work
that would require an absence from home for a month, but could
not, without insulting the employee, offer to pay the employee
$1000 to persuade him to work away from home for a month. Fam-
ily relations and money are not commensurable.
" A beautiful mountain may strike awe in the heart of an observer,
but a statement like "this mountain is worth $10 million" would not
escape from his lips. Environmental wonders and money are not
commensurable.
7
• One should not offer to pay a neighbor $20 to mow one's lawn, or
offer to pay a person for sex. Neighborly and intimate relationships
are not commensurable with money.
4 See Sunstein, supra note 1.
' See id. at 785.
6 See id. at 786; see also RAZ, supra note 1, at 348-49.
SeeSunstein, supra note 1, at 786-87.
" See id. at 787.
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* It is insulting to suggest that an actor's or teacher's worth is equal to
his pay or any amount of monetary compensation.9
* It is wrong to say that a worker's life is worth eight million dollars
(or some other amount), even though the worker accepts a wage
premium of $800 for ajob that carries with it a one-in-ten-thousand
chance of fatal injury above the norm. °
These examples present the following puzzle: Although the
statements command a great deal of assent and appeal to one's intui-
tions, and the simplest explanation for their force is that certain op-
tions are incommensurable, people in fact behave as though they be-
lieved that these options are commensurable.
The reason that people treat supposedly incommensurable op-
tions as though they were commensurable is that resources are scarce
and choices must be made. Sunstein mentions the "desperately poor
[person]" who might abandon a friend for a sum of money, but he is
altogether too delicate." Lawyers, businessmen, movie moguls, poli-
ticians, and even ordinary people constrained by time and resources
drop friends when the costs of maintaining the friendship become
too high. People routinely risk or violate family relationships by ac-
cepting attractive job offers in distant locations. Individuals make
implicit valuations of the environment when they choose detergents,
buy paper products, recycle newspapers but not bottles, purchase
large houses rather than small apartments, and litter. People pay for
sex or for companionship, sometimes overtly and other times in care-
fully disguised manners, such as in the form of gifts. Artists and
teachers become investment bankers when their pay falls below a cer-
tain level. Workers accept premia for risks, and agencies use these
risk premia in order to calculate the costs and benefits of regulations.
The puzzle, then, is why people say, and even believe, that certain
options are incommensurable and sometimes act in ways designed to
maintain the pretense of their incommensurability, while at the same
time acting as though those options were commensurable. Sunstein,
Anderson, and others seize one horn of the dilemma by arguing that
the incommensurability of options is fundamental, and that a theory
of choice that accounts for it can explain people's actions." I will
9 See id. at 788.
10 See id. at 804.
n Id. at 813.
12 See supra note 1.
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seize the other horn of the dilemma and argue that "incommensura-
bility claims," as I call them, emerge in an equilibrium in which peo-
ple rationally seek partners for the purpose of obtaining gains from
cooperation.
I. A MODEL OF PRINCIPLED BEHAVIOR
People can obtain strategic advantages by limiting their options
prior to interactions with others. Suppose, for example, that a buyer
and a seller are negotiating over the sale of a widget, and the price
will be between five and ten. Both parties are willing to accept any
price in that range, but the buyer wants the lowest price and the seller
wants the highest price. If the buyer can bind himself against accept-
ing a high price, and the seller knows this, the buyer has a strategic
advantage. One way the buyer might be able to bind himself to a low
price is by making a deal with a third party prior to this negotiation,
in which the buyer promises to pay the third party twenty if he pays
more than five for the widget. Confronted by this deal, the seller
would concede to the price of five, knowing that the buyer would not
accept a price of six or higher, since that would require the buyer to
pay twenty-six or more for something that he values at ten. This kind
of strategic maneuver can be called a commitment mechanism.'3
One uses commitment mechanisms not only for obtaining advan-
tages against competitors, but also for giving assurances to friends or
partners. Suppose that the seller and the buyer agree on a price, but
although the seller cannot deliver the widget for three weeks, she
needs to be paid right now. The buyer does not trust the seller to
keep her side of the bargain. He fears that if he pays in advance, the
seller will deliver the widget late or not at all, and the buyer believes
that any legal remedy would not provide sufficient compensation.
One way that the seller might overcome the buyer's suspicion is to
give the buyer a beloved pet as a hostage. If the seller fails to deliver
or delivers late, the buyer can dispose of the pet. Because the buyer
does not want the pet, he has no incentive to keep it rather than ac-
cept the widget; and because the seller values the pet more than the
widget or the gains from late delivery, she will deliver on time. The
is See THOMAS C. SCHELUNG, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 21-52 (1980) (discussing
the way in which outside or self-imposed commitments affect bargaining relationships,
strategies, and outcomes).
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commitment mechanism in this case overcomes a barrier to coopera-
tion. 4
The two commitment mechanisms discussed so far-third-party
deals and hostages-are not as important in social and commercial
life as a third: reputation. If, in the first case, the buyer has a reputa-
tion as a hard bargainer, this could mean that people routinely
charge him five rather than ten. The buyer can plausibly say to any
particular seller, "If I paid you more than five, then everyone else
would demand more than five, so I would lose a lot more than what I
give you in this deal." If, in the second case, the seller has a reputa-
tion as an honorable dealer, she can say to the buyer, "I won't fail to
deliver, because if I did, then my gains from this deal would be out-
weighed by my losses in every future deal that falls through because
the buyer does not trust me to deliver." Reputation, like the contract
to pay twenty to the third party and the hostaged pet, enables its
owner to commit himself to certain actions and therefore to over-
come problems of opportunism in dealings with partners and com-
petitors. This is why reputation is a valuable asset.'
Having a reputation means being "principled" 
in a certain sense.16
In ordinary talk, people often say that an unprincipled person acts
out of self-interest and a principled person does not, instead con-
forming to the rules of morality or to the demands of altruism. This
is not a helpful way of distinguishing between principled and unprin-
cipled people. One often observes people who are considered to be
principled violating their principles when the gains are sufficiently
high. Moreover, the tough bargainer can be described as principled,
but his principles serve his interests and have little to do with the re-
quirements of moral theory. Finally, altruism is different from prin-
cipled behavior. The parent who violates every rule of morality in or-
der to help his child get ahead is an altruist, but is not a principled
person. A person who makes charitable donations might be moti-
vated by principle rather than by altruism. The tough negotiator is
motivated by principle, not by altruism. The question is, then, how
14 See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange,
73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 537 (1983) (arguing that"the use of hostages to support ex-
change is widespread and economically important").
's See SCHELLING, supra note 13, at 35-43 (discussing the use of reputation to in-
crease the value of a threat). The value of reputation as an asset is now a common
theme in economics. See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIc THEORY
531-36 (1990).
,1 See SCHELLING, supra note 13, at 34 (analyzing the role of principles in bargain-
ing).
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can one explain principled behavior without abandoning the premise
of utility-maximization.
One way to approach this question is to imagine that everyone is
always in a relationship with someone else. Call this someone else a
"partner," in order to abstract away from all the possible contexts:
marital, social, commercial, and political. A relationship can be un-
derstood as a repeat prisoner's dilemma: In every round, each part-
ner gains the highest payoff by "cheating" if the other partner
"cooperates," the next highest payoff by cooperating if the other
partner cooperates, the next highest payoff by cheating if the other
partner cheats, and the lowest payoff by cooperating if the other
partner cheats. As is well known, the rational move for each partner
is to cheat if he does not care about future payoffs very much. If both
partners care about the future sufficiently and the relationship has no
definite ending point, there is a possible equilibrium in which both
parties cooperate in every round.'
7
The reason that it is important that people care sufficiently about
the future is that strategies that can maintain cooperation must
threaten retaliation against anyone who cheats, and the only way to
retaliate against someone who cheats is to deprive that person of fu-
ture cooperation. Because most people care about the future, the
threat of such retaliation can be effective. But it is reasonable to as-
sume that different people value the future differently; in other
words, people have different tastes about future payoffs ("discount
rates"), just as people have different tastes for various goods. Young
people, for example, are often impulsive: their decisions do not re-
flect much concern about the future consequences of their actions, so
one says that they have high discount rates. Ambitious people who
care deeply about earning fame or fortune later in life, parents who
care about having enough money to support their children as they
grow up, workers who want to have a comfortable retirement-all
these people have low discount rates. Notice that, because discount
rates are invisible, people can only infer the discount rate of another
person, and they do so by observing his behavior.
In a cooperative relationship people with high discount rates
cheat in circumstances in which people with low discount rates do not
cheat. For example, some employees cannot resist sleeping late or
skipping work even though they know that this behavior will reduce
their future earnings; other employees are deterred from this misbe-
17 See, e.g., KREPS, supra note 15, at 503-15.
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havior because they value their future earnings a great deal. Some
wives cheat on their husbands even though they know that their infi-
delity might be revealed and, if so, will injure the long-term health of
their marriage; other wives do not cheat on their husbands because
they do not want to risk their marriage. Some suppliers deliver defec-
tive goods, because they do not expect to remain in business long;
other suppliers deliver goods that are even above the stipulated qual-
ity or make other concessions to their buyers, because they want the
buyers to continue doing business with them in the future. These
patterns suggest a possible, but preliminary, definition of principled
behavior. Because the people with low discount rates rarely cheat in
the many relationships in which they take part, observers are likely to
regard them as "principled." People who do cheat will be regarded as
"unprincipled."
This definition is useful, because the explanation of principled-
ness does not appeal tautologically to an assumption that people are
motivated by principle, nor falsely to people's altruism, nor emptily to
people's adherence to moral rules. Rather, the explanation appeals
to the standard premises of rational choice theory. It also does not
assume that people are "selfish": it takes no position on whether
people's ends are self-regarding or other-regarding, or a mixture of
both.'8
The definition, however, has several defects. The main defect is
that it does not explain the choppiness or discontinuity that charac-
terizes principled behavior so much as the plain fact that some people
cooperate more than others. Consider three people, A, B, and C. A
has a very low discount rate, B has an ordinary discount rate, and C
'8 To see this more clearly, note that two people, X and Y, who are both altruistic
toward the other, face a kind of inverse prisoner's dilemma: each party wants to
"cheat" by sacrificing the largest joint surplus in order to give the other party the
higher payoff; but if both parties cheat, they end up at the jointly minimizing out-
come. For example, suppose that each party has ten dollars, and can choose between
giving the other party eight dollars at the cost of ten dollars (the loss of two dollars
resulting from the cost of transacting), or keeping his ten dollars. Xwould think, "if Y
keeps his ten dollars, then if I give Ymy ten dollars, Ywould be, with $18, better off
than if I keep my ten dollars; if Ygives me his ten dollars, then if I give Ymy ten dol-
lars, Ywould be, with eight dollars, better off; therefore, I will give ten dollars to Y."
But Ywill think the same way, and they end up at the jointly minimizing outcome of
eight dollars for each player. If they are principled and can resist the temptation to
cheat (meaning they both keep their money), they end up with an outcome of ten dol-
lars for each person. Cf 0. HENRY, The Gift of the Magi, in THE POCKET BOOK OF 0.
HENRY STORIES 1 (Harry Hansen ed., 1971) (providing an example where X and Y
would have been better off if they had not exchanged gifts).
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has a high discount rate. One might therefore observe that A never
cheats in ordinary relationships, B rarely cheats, and C frequently
cheats. The question is why people would say that A is principled and
C is not, rather than simply saying A cares more about future payoffs
than C does. Why do people tend to describe others in a dichoto-
mous way-as principled or not-rather than saying that some people
cooperate more than other people do? A further defect with the the-
ory is that it does not explain self-presentation. Why is it that A would
never say, "I have never cheated, but only because a sufficiently valu-
able opportunity has not yet presented itself'? Why would B and C
insist that they are principled, and try to explain away their defections
rather than admitting them?
One can solve these problems by relaxing two implicit assump-
tions of the model-namely, that people have perfect, or at least
pretty good, information about the actions that other people have
taken in the past, and that the only way to establish a good reputation
is by cooperating in existing relationships. Suppose that Xis trying to
decide whether to enter a relationship (social, commercial, or politi-
cal) with Y X has no past experience with Y, so X cannot infer Ys
discount rate from his own observations of Ys behavior. He knows
that Yhas a husband, several commercial partners, many friends, and
he has heard that Yhas never cheated on her husband or her friends,
but that many of her commercial partners complain that she cuts
comers. Xs problem is that he does not know how reliable any of the
information-positive and negative-is. Maybe Yhas cheated on her
husband but is very discreet; maybe Yhas not cheated on commercial
partners but they are envious of her success and want to draw away
her customers. If other desirable partners are available, X might ref-
use to enter a relationship with Y, despite her many attractions. By
contrast, if Yhas an unimpeachable reputation for integrity in all of
her relationships, Xwill want to enter a relationship with her, too.
Because observers have imperfect information about a person's
behavior in the past and because many people do not participate in
many relationships over a long period of time, an agent's consistently
cooperative behavior in a relationship may not suffice to establish a
good reputation. The agent, therefore, has an incentive to engage in
actions that will improve his reputation-actions in addition to, and
other than, cooperating in existing relationships. Because an essen-
tial condition of a good reputation is a low discount rate, people try to
establish good reputations by engaging in actions that show that they
have a low discount rate. As noted before, discount rates likely are
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distributed across the population: call those with low discount rates
the "good" or "better" types, and those with high discount rates the
"bad" or "worse" types.' 9 Because the better types care about the fu-
ture, they can engage in costly actions as a way of demonstrating their
concern for the future, as long as potential partners believe that only
the better types engage in these actions, and thus are willing to enter
long-term relationships with people who engage in these actions. If
the action, or "signal," has the right cost structure, bad types cannot
engage in it, because their (highly) discounted future payoffs are less
than the cost of the action. However, there is a lot of noise in the
world: different people interpret actions in different ways, they make
different estimates about their costs, the costs of actions and payoffs
from cooperation change over time, and so on. Accordingly, some-
times bad types are able to mimic the signals issued by good types;
sometimes they will even take the initiative and issue new signals, with
the result that the better types must scramble to mimic them.
As an example, one theory holds that firms invest in advertising in
order to reveal that they are good types. Customers cannot observe
the quality of goods prior to purchasing them, but they can observe
quality afterwards. A good type, in this context, manufactures high-
quality goods in the hope that customers will continue to do business
with it and will tell other people about the firm. Before a seller has a
reputation, it invests in advertising in order to show that it expects
enough future business to recover the costs of advertising. Because
bad-type sellers manufacture low-quality goods and therefore do not
expect future business, they cannot afford expensive advertising.
Even empty, meaningless advertising, so long as it is obviously expen-
sive, operates as a signal that distinguishes the high sellers from the
low sellers, so long as customers believe that any firm that spends a lot
of money on advertising expects to obtain high returns in the future.
In equilibrium, good sellers advertise and sell high-quality products at
a high price, while bad sellers do not advertise (or advertise very lit-
tle) and sell low-quality products at a low price, or do not make any
sales at all. °
'9 I assume continuous types rather than dichotomous types; on this assumption
and its problems, see B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theoy of Conformity, 102J. POL. ECON.
841, 846-47 (1994).
20 See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contrac-
tual Performanc4 89J. POL. ECON. 615, 630 (1981) ("[W]hen consumers do not know
the minimum quality-guaranteeing price, the larger is a firm's brand name capital in-
vestment relative to sales, the more likely its price premium is sufficient to motivate
high quality production.").
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Individuals also send signals to each other in commercial and so-
cial settings. A common form of signal is the gift. One person do-
nates a gift to another person as a way of showing a desire to maintain
or enhance a relationship, or at least to forestall the inference that he
wants to end the relationship. Gifts serve as signals because they are
costly to the donor, either because they are expensive, or because
they require an investment in information about the donee's tastes.
In equilibrium, good types who have committed to a relationship
send each other gifts, while bad types do not.2
But these forms of signaling will not always succeed, and they are
likely not to succeed when signals are too noisy. Recall that in the ad-
vertising example the good types must charge high prices in order to
recover the cost of manufacturing high-quality goods. A bad type of-
fers a low price, claiming that the low price is due to more efficient
methods of production, rather than to the low quality of its merchan-
dise. The good types can distinguish themselves from the bad types
only if customers believe that only good types can afford expensive
advertising. Customers, however, might not believe that firms that
purchase expensive advertisements produce better goods. The firms
might try to implant this belief in the minds of customers by saying
that their goods are better than those of their competitors, rather
than using empty advertisements. But customers might not believe
this statement, or they might not hear and remember it amid the ca-
cophony of competing advertisements. Even if customers believe that
firms using expensive advertisements are more likely to produce bet-
ter goods, they might not be able to distinguish expensive and not-so-
expensive advertisements. In such a case, a bad firm that purchases
not-so-expensive advertisements is indistinguishable from a good
firm, and the good firm will mimic the bad firm's advertising strategy
in order to save money.
In equilibrium, both the good and the bad firm will say that they
always deliver high-quality goods in their not-so-expensive advertise-
ments. There are two theories for why they will make this statement.
First, they must say something in order to persuade buyers that the ad-
vertisement shows that they are good types, and the natural thing to
say is that they are good types. They will say "I never cheat" (that is,
21 See Colin Camerer, Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols, AM. J. Soc. S180,
(Supp. 1988) (analyzing conditions under which gifts can serve as signals); Eric A.
Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 Wis. L.
REV. 567, 579-80 (discussing how gift-giving distinguishes cooperators from opportun-
ists).
1195
1196 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 146:1185
"my goods are high quality"), rather than "I usually never cheat" or "I
cheat one percent of the time," because the claim that one never
cheats is focal in Schelling's sense.n A firm that wants to persuade
buyers that it is reliable makes an absolute claim of reliability (100%
reliable), rather than a partial claim (98% or 97.5% reliable), even if
the partial claim is more honest, because people do not differentiate
among shades of reliability and will interpret anything less than a
claim of absolute reliability as an admission of substantial unreliabil-
ity. Given that in signaling models any action with the right cost
structure can be a signal, the most natural statement in the advertis-
ing context is a claim that the goods are always high-quality.
The second theory for why all kinds of firms will claim never to
cheat is that some buyers might be credulous (by which I mean
poorly informed), even if most buyers are not. If these buyers accept
statements at face value, then they will buy from the firm that makes
the strongest claim that it does not cheat. Any firm that honestly says
that it cheats 10% of the time will lose these buyers to a firm that says
that it cheats 9% of the time. Firms will bid each other down to
claims of 0% cheating in order to avoid losing buyers to each other.23
The same result is obtained by assuming that none of the buyers is
poorly informed but that a tiny fraction of firms really is principled.
To be clear about why people act this way, put yourself in the
shoes of the buyer in the second example. If the seller tells you that
she never cheats, then you might not believe her, but because all the
other sellers say the same thing, this statement gives you no basis for
rejecting this seller in favor of some other seller. But if the seller tells
you that she sometimes cheats, while all other sellers deny ever cheat-
ing, you might as well take your chances with another seller. One
might argue that the buyer should admire the seller who admits that
she cheats: this seller is, at least, honest. But someone who cheats is,
by definition, dishonest. If she says that she cheats, you have no rea-
son to believe that she is more honest than people who deny that they
cheat. It is at least possible that someone in the group of people who
deny that they cheat really is honest; it is impossible that the self-
proclaimed cheater is honest.
Even if you are so cynical that you would never believe absolute or
extreme claims, you are not likely to treat differently the seller who
makes absolute claims and the seller who does not. You gain nothing
See SCHELLING, supra note 13, at 57 (introducing the idea of focal points).
2 It is possible that, instead, markets will segment.
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by treating them differently. (Indeed, if you and others tried to treat
them differently, they would conform their behavior to your expecta-
tions without being any less likely to cheat you.) But if at least some
people are credulous, sellers benefit by making absolute claims.
These claims cost them nothing. They do not lose the cynics' busi-
ness, and they gain, or avoid losing, the business of the credulous
people.
In sum, firms are forced to make exaggerated claims about the
purity of their motives and the quality of their products. These exag-
gerated claims of never cheating can be described as claims to be
principled, while the claim that one occasionally cheats is not a claim
21that one is principled.
The analysis applies not only to relationships between firms and
consumers. It applies to any cooperative relationship. Everyone will
claim to be principled as well as invest resources in advertisements or
gifts. The bad or worse types will claim to be principled either be-
cause of the possibility that someone will believe them or because
principledness is focal. The good types have to follow the bad types
or risk being mistaken as bad types. Returning to the earlier exam-
ples, the buyer will say, "I never pay more than rock-bottom price."
He will never say, "I never pay more than rock-bottom price unless
I'm really desperate for the goods," even though the latter statement
is surely more accurate than the former. In the second example, the
seller will say, "I never deliver late," rather than, "I deliver late only
when I am having serious labor problems." In social relationships,
people say to their friends and lovers, "I will never betray you," or
"you can count on me," rather than, "you can count on me unless my
gains from the relationship fall below a certain threshold."
I am not arguing that a seller would never say that it will not have
labor problems that might interfere with its ability to perform. Some
sellers do say that, but that is not the same as saying that one will
cheat. When the seller informs the buyer of the possibility of labor
problems interfering with delivery and the buyer nonetheless accepts
the seller's offer-no doubt with a price adjustment that reflects this
2' Technically, the claim that one is principled is not a signal because it is not
costly. I have treated it as "outside the signaling model," simply as people's descrip-
tion of what they are doing "in the model." A more precise and complete model
would treat the claim that one is principled as "cheap talk," but the same result would
obtain in a cheap-talk model. See, e.g., Stephen Morris, An Instrumental Theory of Po-
litical Correctness (Jan. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review) (showing that when reputation matters enough, an informed
individual cannot convey certain kinds of information to an uninformed individual).
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risk-then failure to deliver because of labor problems is not cheat-
ing. The value-maximizing obligations that emerge in a relationship
can be rigid or flexible, depending on context.
Two further points should be made. First, a person who claims to
be principled is not being honest. As mentioned above, a rational
person will sacrifice his reputation when the gains are sufficiently
high. But a principled person is one who claims never to make such a
tradeoff. The person who claims to be principled does not say: "I will
not cheat unless the gains exceed reputational losses." He says: "I
will never cheat." People are driven to extreme statements by their
focal nature and by the need to match the exaggerated claims of bad
types. Thus, in equilibrium all people claim to be principled, but
they are believed only by credulous people (such as children, whose
discovery of this fact about the adult world is the beginning of their
disillusionment). This is why an air of corruption hangs over every
bargaining table.
Second, good types try to distinguish themselves from bad types
by behaving consistently with their words as much as possible and by
making claims that can be verified. The claim that one is principled
cannot be disconfirmed by the addressee until it is too late-until the
speaker has cheated. But the speaker might overcome the cheapness-
of-talk problem by integrating claims about his principledness into a
general theory about himself. Consider the following common
statements: "I feel terribly guilty when I tell a lie." "My parents
taught me never to take advantage of other people." "God punishes
those who tell lies." "In the army we were taught always to tell the
truth." Statements like these are more plausible than acontextual as-
sertions of truthfulness because the speaker reveals other aspects
about himself that can then be used to verify his truthfulness. If the
first speaker later plays a nasty practical joke, the second speaker
turns out to be an orphan, the third an atheist, and the fourth a draft
dodger, then the listener has reason to doubt the speaker's claim to
be a truth-teller.
Thus, in their effort to distinguish themselves from bad types,
some good types engage in speech and behavior in which they would
not engage but for the problem of distinguishing themselves. Note
that good types are driven not only to distort their speech, but also to
distort their behavior. I might claim that I am principled because I
spend long hours at church. If spending long hours at church is suf-
ficiently costly and differentially costly, I might distinguish myself as a
good type by making this claim, but only if my claim can be verified.
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If others observe that I do not go to church, I will be exposed as a bad
type. I go to church, then, as a way of showing that I am principled,
not because I seek religious solace. My investment in this costly signal
enables partners to cooperate with me to a greater extent than with
bad types who cannot afford the signal. In this sense, the signal serves
to enhance cooperation. Still, I am not principled, because I will cheat
if an exogenous change modifies my payoffs by a sufficient amount.
Before moving on to the issue of incommensurability, let me
summarize the argument so far, point out one additional implication,
and respond to an important objection. The argument is that people
acting in their rational self-interest face powerful incentives to claim
to be principled in the ordinary sense of the word; that is, never to
cheat in the cooperative relationships to which they belong. Having
made the claim to be principled, people must act fairly consistently
with the demands of principle, lest they be immediately exposed as
bad types. At the same time, people will cheat when the short-term
gains outweigh the long-term reputational costs. Given the focal
character of absolute statements, and the existence of some people
who are credulous, one has a strong incentive not to admit the truth,
and to claim, to the contrary, that one never cheats. Since, in equilib-
rium, no person admits that he would ever cheat, the statement that
one does cheat would cause people to infer that one belongs to the
bad type.
It is worth emphasizing that because sometimes a person's princi-
pled claims will constrain his behavior, the person will cheat less often
(though he will cheat if the payoff is high enough) than he would if
he did not make principled claims. Therefore, claims to be princi-
pled actually may produce social benefits-by reducing the amount of
cheating-even though they do not ensure or reflect principled be-
havior.
The objection to the theory is that it treats people like "rational
fools," in Sen's words.2 Sen argued influentially that economics as-
sumes that people are rational calculators, whereas in fact people are
often motivated by principle, or what he calls "commitment."2 6 My
theory shows why people act as if they were motivated by principle,
and it therefore addresses Sen's criticism to the extent it is intended
as a critique of the explanatory ambitions of rational choice theory.
2 Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic
Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977).
26Id. at 317-18.
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But Sen also argued that the methodology of economics misses an
27
important side of human motivation, phenomenologically speaking.
The problem with Sen's argument, however, is that simply assuming
that people act out of principle and rational calculation gives one less
methodological purchase than the ordinary rational choice assump-
tions do, without, as far as I can tell, compensating for this loss by
producing a methodological gain.28 One effort to solve this problem
without abandoning the rational choice perspective is Frank's theory
of the motivational force of emotions. According to Frank, people
retaliate at appropriate times and decline to cheat because they are
compelled by their emotions.2 But Frank does not explain why peo-
ple sometimes can overcome their emotions and sometimes cannot,
with the result that in his theory, principles operate as a kind of drag
on rational calculation but do not substitute for it.
In any event, I concede, following Sen and Frank, that the theory
I present is not supposed to represent human motivation in all its
complexity. Instead, it abstracts out one element of human motiva-
tion in the hope of shedding light on the problem with which I be-
gan. After all, this problem-why people represent themselves as
principled when they are not really-has not been solved by people
who take alternative methodological approaches.
II. INCOMMENSURABILITY
I have used the idea of being principled in a broad sense, pretty
much as the equivalent of being a person who does not cheat in rela-
tionships, a cooperator. People claim to be principled because others
infer that people who do not make such claims are bad types. Simi-
larly, people claim that options are incommensurable because others
infer that people who do not make incommensurability claims are
bad types.
To understand this point more clearly, suppose that people be-
lieve most things a person says about himself, and this person wants
people to enter cooperative relationships with him. What sort of
things might that person say? Recall that a person is an attractive co-
217 See id. at 317.
Cf.JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOcIETY 35-37 (1989) (describing social norms,
altruism, envy and spite, and rational, selfish process- and outcome-oriented motiva-
tions). Elster's description of the riot of human motivations provides a phenome-
nologically sound, but methodologically sterile, basis for understanding social behav-
ior.
SeeROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 53 (1988).
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operative partner if he has a low discount rate, because a person with
a low discount rate is relatively unlikely to cheat in a game character-
ized by indefinitely repeated transactions. But the low discount rate is
not a sufficient condition for cooperation. It must also be the case
that the person gains, in any given round, relatively little by cheating
when the other person cooperates. So, in order to attract cooperative
partners, a person will say that (1) he has a low discount rate and (2)
his outside opportunities are not valuable.
People make these claims in complex ways. First, they claim to be
mature rather than immature, self-disciplined rather than impulsive,
strong rather than weak. All of these claims are about discount rates.
Second, people claim that if they cheated they would feel guilty or
ashamed, they would bum in hell, or they would not be trusted by
other people. These claims all are about outside opportunities.
Third, people claim that they are principled or honorable, or that
they do not engage in rational or strategic behavior. These claims
constitute a denial that one is even capable of engaging in the sort of
calculations that make strategic behavior a danger in the first place.
When a person makes an incommensurability claim, he is making
a claim of either the second or the third kind. One incommensur-
ability claim is that the benefits from cooperating cannot be com-
pared with the benefits from cheating. To admit that the two kinds of
benefits are comparable would be to say that one will choose the ac-
tion (cooperation or cheating) that provides the higher benefit. De-
nying the possibility of comparison is a denial that the speaker can
engage in strategic behavior and, by implication, a guarantee that the
speaker can only cooperate. The incommensurability claim is the
claim that there is no question of a tradeoff: The benefit from coop-
eration is "differently valuable"30 from the monetary gains from cheat-
ing.
The other incommensurability claim is that the benefits from co-
operating are infinitely high. If the benefits from cooperation are in-
finitely high, whereas (by implication) the benefits from cheating are
finite (if sometimes very high), even a rational maximizer will never
cheat, if that means that in a later round the gains from cooperation
will be lost. The incommensurability claim is again that there is no
question of tradeoff, but this time because the benefits of cooperation
are so high.
so See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 813.
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These two ways of claiming to be principled track a dispute be-
tween Sunstein and Regan. Regan argues that the incommensurabil-
ity claim implies that the speaker places an infinite value on some-
thing.3 ' Sunstein argues that the incommensurability claim implies
that the speaker places a different kind of value on something."' Be-
cause people make both kinds of claims, and both kinds of claims
serve the same general strategic purpose, for my argument there is no
need to make the distinction.
As an example, consider a person who refuses to answer a cost-
benefit survey about the value of a mountain view, claiming that no
amount of money can compensate him for obstruction of that view.
In this person's community, the commitment to the environment
serves as a signal of one's loyalty to others; anyone who says that the
mountain view can be traded for something else would be considered
a bad type. To show that he is not a bad type, this person would deny
the possibility of such a tradeoff. This claim could be interpreted as
an assertion that the mountain view has an infinite value, or as an as-
sertion that comparisons cannot be made-it does not matter. Both
claims serve the strategic purpose of signaling one's loyalty to the
relevant community.
Why is the simpler interpretation not that the person places an
infinite or incommensurable value on the mountain view? The an-
swer is that, except in extremely rare circumstances, people do not act
as if they placed an infinite value on anything: Individuals routinely
make tradeoffs in their lives. For example, people sacrifice mountain
views to move to a location where there are better jobs, better schools
for their children, and more culture. When pressed, people admit
that they would give up a mountain view if that meant saving lives,
producing medicines, or reducing crime and unemployment. A per-
son who places an infinite or incommensurable value on something
in fact would give up everything he owned, every future opportunity,
every good for other people, in order to maintain that invaluable
thing. If there are any people like this, they are too few to have
strong claims on the direction of public policy.
A response to this argument is that the person would not trade
the mountain view for money, but would trade it for other goods,
such as reduced unemployment in the region. That is, the mountain
3' See Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Free-
dom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 1058 (1989).
32 See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 813.
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view and money are incommensurable, but the view and employment
are comparable. But it is hard to see why, if a view and employment
are comparable, they cannot both be compared to money, which
serves as a metric. A sum of money has as much in common with a
mountain view and with a reduction in unemployment, as the latter
two have with each other. The implicit assumption here is that the
sum of money would be used for a self-interested, rather than an
other-regarding, purpose. That is why trading the mountain view for
money would be objectionable, just as trading the mountain view for
a private swimming pool would be objectionable. A person in the hy-
pothetical community could overtly make a tradeoff between the
mountain view and the reduction in unemployment, but not between
either of these options and a sum of money or a private swimming
pool, because one obtains reputational gains by professing respect for
the quality of life of others, not by demonstrating concern about
one's possessions. People who care about themselves too much are
not as attractive cooperative partners as-are more likely to cheat
than-people who care about others as well, because we do not think
that people are as likely to violate obligations for the sake of other
people, or for abstract classes of other people, as they are for their
own sake. (People who are too altruistic, however, are avoided just as
vigorously as people who are too greedy; both kinds of people are un-
reliable.)
Another example is a professor who refuses to accept money to
skip a faculty meeting but who would skip the faculty meeting in or-
der to stay home with a sick child when child care is not available.
One might believe that these three options-going to the meeting,
taking the money, or staying with the child-are incommensurable.
Preliminarily, note that the monetary option is unacceptable not be-
cause it involves money. Most people would think that the professor
could skip the faculty meeting if the government threatens to fine
him $100,000 if he attends. The reason that the bribe is unacceptable
and the threat and the child care option are acceptable is that the
implicit, value-maximizing obligations that emerge among faculty
members allow one to skip meetings in order to meet serious per-
sonal obligations that conflict with them, or to avoid serious harms.
These personal obligations do not allow one to satisfy predictable
fluctuations in tastes or to seize predictable opportunities. This view
is standard in contract theory, and it tracks Raz's theory of exclusion-
ary reasons, which is related both to his argument about incommen-
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surability and to a discussion of promises.33 Still, nothing about the
example suggests that such behavior is inconsistent with the choices
of rational actors.
A related example is the person who refuses to trade time with his
family for money, but would trade time with his family for a better ca-
reer opportunity. This person does not claim that time with his fam-
ily has infinite value. Rather, he claims that it cannot be compared
with money or even with the better career opportunity on a common
metric. It is hard, however, to see what is accomplished by this argu-
ment. Trading time with one's family for money would likely count as
cheating on the family relationship. Trading time with one's family
for a better job opportunity would count as cheating in some families,
but not in others-it simply depends on what value-maximizing obli-
gations emerge over time. Incommensurability arises because people
promise not to trade time with the family for anything. This absolut-
ist claim is, again, more focal and more resistant to the competing ex-
aggerations of bad types than a more honest and limited claim, such
as, "I will not trade off time with the family except for something that
is very important to me." The moral awkwardness of the tradeoff re-
flects the sense that one is caught in a game that denies its players the
luxury of honesty.
As discussed above, this is not to say that incommensurability
claims are empty talk. In fact, the moral quality of these claims puts
people in a bind. On the one hand, one cannot truly act consistently
with them. On the other hand, if one does not act consistently with
them, one may lose the reputation that the claims are intended to es-
tablish. People shade their behavior so that violations of their in-
commensurability claims occur relatively infrequently in ordinary life,
but they do not act consistently with them. The problem torments
politicians because their words and actions are scrutinized so carefully
by the press. The politician who refuses to make incommensurability
claims will be called a pragmatist by his friends, and a person lacking
in vision by his enemies. The politician who makes incommensurabil-
ity claims will be called principled or rigid. When the latter is forced
to compromise, he is then called slick. Ordinary people can avoid
these problems as long as the incommensurability claim is consistent
with rational action, that is, when cooperation remains rational; when
not, they cheat and try to conceal their opportunism behind casuistry.
SeeJOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NoRMs 69-71 (1990) (drawing an anal-
ogy between the formal features of promises and decisions as reasons for acting).
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A third example is the friend who cancels lunch. A person Xwho
offers his friend Y twenty dollars as compensation for a canceled
lunch sends the wrong signal-it violates the "ideology" of friendship.
(The loaded term "ideology" will make a reappearance later in this
paper.) According to the ideology of friendship, a friend never
cheats another friend. Y might think that if X offers twenty dollars,
then X must believe that Y thinks that X's cancellation was a form of
cheating that would cost Y twenty dollars. If X thinks that Y places a
monetary value on this (minor) form of cheating, then X must think
that Ywould also place a monetary value on more significant forms of
cheating or betrayal. If X thinks that Y can be compensated for any
betrayal, then X must think that Y puts a monetary (and finite) value
on their friendship. That implies, however, that X thinks that Y
would cheat if the payoff were sufficiently great. By offering twenty
dollars, X implies to Y that he believes that Y is not really a friend,
which, of course, offends Yas much as if Xsaid to Y, "you're a liar."
But why doesn't Ysay to herself, "Xis no saint, but he still can be
my friend; only saints place an infinite value on friendships"? The
answer is that absolutist claims are focal and resistant to the exagger-
ated claims of bad types. If Xvalues Ys friendship at $A and reveals
this to Y, then someone else will claim that he values Y's friendship at
$A + 1; then another person will claim that he values Y's friendship at
$A + 2; and so on. Only an infinite valuation cannot be trumped by
an effort by a bad type to insist that he values the friendship so much
more. What frustrates the good type is that, although by claiming to
value the relationship at an infinite amount he avoids the inference
that he belongs to the bad type, he also is unable to distinguish him-
self from the bad types and he also has been corrupted by his emula-
tion of them.m
Incommensurability claims occur because money is a problem.
The problem with money is that, by supplying a scale for ranking all
options, it exposes the strategic basis of cooperation, and, by exposing
the strategic basis of cooperation, it interferes with cooperation.
Given the observable alternatives supplied by the market, the value a
person places on a particular relationship can be estimated within a
range. That person must exaggerate the value he places on the rela-
tionship in order to avoid the inference that he belongs to the bad
type and persuade his partner that he values the relationship at the
34 Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 1. To be sure, Cordelia opted
out of Goneril and Regan's bidding war; but look at what happened to her.
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upper end of the range. The exaggeration is an embarrassment,
however, because everyone knows that it is an exaggeration. This is
the source both of the stigma that is associated with money and of the
market, and the feeling of alienation that the market economy is said
to produce.35
The stigma reflects the same dynamics that give rise to incom-
mensurability claims: People stigmatize others who too overtly desire
money in order to represent, by comparison, their own immunity
from being bought off or tempted to defect by a higher payoff. This
is why people must constantly deny that they are motivated by money
even as they rush around accumulating it. The feeling of alienation is
the result of the dissonance between one's behavior, which inevitably
reflects tradeoffs, and the public denial of this fact.
The analysis is the same for neighborly, intimate, work, and po-
litical relationships. These are all cooperative ventures in which it is
important to signal that one is not a cheater. Parties to these rela-
tionships continuously send each other signals of their loyalty, pre-
cisely because they know-and they know that their partners know-
that it may be worthwhile for them to break off the relationship. One
way to signal loyalty is to say that the relationship is incommensurable
with other options. Few people really believe this, but no one can ex-
press their skepticism openly without risking the end of the relation-
ship.
As we saw earlier, the claim that environmental goods are of infi-
nite or incommensurable value also illustrates the use of incommen-
surability claims to signal that one will not cheat. People who are in
environmental groups (defined broadly to include people who are in
any type of relationship and who also value the environment a great
deal) show their loyalty to other members by saying that they place
infinite or incommensurable value on the goals to which the group is
devoted. People do this in order to persuade others that they do not
belong to the bad type. This logic can be extended to other activities.
Teachers tell each other that teaching is of great value in order to
persuade each other that they are loyal to the group endeavor. So do
research scholars, doctors, lawyers, actors, artists, and, no doubt, eve-
ryone else. Telling a coworker that "we are paid what we are worth" is
not going to endear you to him; telling him that "we are all under-
3' Cf SIMMEL, supra note 1 (discussing the alienating effect of money); cf. also
NIGEL DODD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF MONEY 46-52 (1994) (outlining Simmel's discussion
of the alienating effect of money).
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paid, and no one appreciates the value of what we do" might. The
person who makes the first statement cannot be trusted in, say, the
formation of a union; the person who makes the second statement at
least might be trustworthy.
An objection to the argument so far is that people are not as cyni-
cal as the argument implies. The argument, however, does not claim
that people are cynical, or that they make incommensurability claims
cynically. Many people believe their incommensurability claims. One
can sincerely make such claims as long as circumstances do not pro-
vide a valuable opportunity to cheat. As long as the demands of in-
terest and of ideology converge, there is no cognitive dissonance that
must be resolved, at least for an unreflective person. When they do
conflict, the usual response is to rationalize one's defection; that is, to
revise one's story about oneself or about the action that is believable
and that preserves one's reputation or self-image as a principled per-
son. For example: "That was not really cheating, because the other
person was about to cheat me, anyway"; or, "Everyone has a lapse now
and then, and this won't happen again."1
6
III. IMPLICATIONS
It would be convenient if the theory I have described implied that
the government should simply ignore incommensurability claims
when determining policy, but life is more complicated. Imagine that
the government must decide whether to preserve a small patch of
forest or to allow companies to exploit it. The benefit from exploita-
tion is the creation of jobs for impoverished members of a Native
American tribe and the production of medicine that would reduce
the suffering of AIDS patients. The cost is the elimination of a piece
of the environment, which, according to surveys of some nearby resi-
dents and some citizens living elsewhere in the country, has infinite
or incomparable value. What should the government do?
The simple response is to say that the government should either
ignore the infinite valuations or should estimate the amount of
money that the protestors would trade off in order to preserve the
piece of forest. Because these people do not really value the project
at negative infinity and do not really believe that the losses and the
3 See the discussion of "avoision" in LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTrON GAINS: EvASION,
BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW (1996) (outlining the relation-
ship between "sleazy evasion" and "circumspect avoidance" of legal and moral rules).
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gains are incommensurable, their survey answers should carry little
weight with the government.
The first problem with the simple response is that it ignores the
important role that incommensurability claims play in social, com-
mercial, and political life. Even though incommensurability claims
do not reflect true valuations, they are often valuable as forms of be-
havior. They help maintain cooperative relationships, and coopera-
tive relationships are valuable as long as they do not injure third par-
ties. If the state could forbid people to make incommensurability
claims, this prohibition could (though not necessarily) make people
worse off, because it would be harder for people to signal their suit-
ability for a cooperative relationship. Of course, the state could not
forbid people to make such claims; but even ignoring such claims
might disvalue them in a way that reduces their utility for strategic
purposes. Indeed, from a utilitarian perspective, the incommensur-
ability problem puts the government in a bind. If the government
takes incommensurability claims seriously, it must fail to make trade-
offs that increase social welfare. But if it discounts them, it might in-
terfere with people's efforts to engage in valuable cooperative ven-
tures.
Still, one should distinguish between the existence of incommen-
surability and other principled claims, and what these claims are
about. The government cannot prevent people from making any in-
commensurability claim, and even if it could, there is no reason to be-
lieve that the new equilibrium would be characterized by greater so-
cial welfare. But some incommensurability claims are more socially
costly than others. People for whom ethnic purity is a matter of prin-
ciple might be superb cooperators within their own ethnic group.
These people claim that they will not cheat on members of their own
group in order to obtain benefits from outsiders. This is an incom-
mensurability claim because they deny that any amount of outside
benefit will break the bonds of ethnic loyalty. The effectiveness of
this claim at promoting cooperation can be seen in the history of na-
tionalist movements, most recently in the former Yugoslavia.s In the
37 If people can inculcate themselves or their children with a commitment to in-
commensurability, they might make themselves into more reliable cooperative part-
ners. Cf FRANK, supra note 29 (proposing a similar role for the emotions); Frederick
Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1215 (1998) (making an
analogous argument at the level of social choice).
38 See RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOGIC OF GROUP CONFLICT 156-63
(1995) (discussing the strategic structure of conflict in Yugoslavia).
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United States, this claim frequently has been advanced by whites as a
way of strengthening their bonds with each other. Yet clearly this
kind of incommensurability claim deserves no respect from the gov-
ernment, for the advancement of this claim commits the speaker to
harming third parties. A similar argument can be made about relig-
ious incommensurability claims. By comparison, incommensurability
claims about one's family and friends are relatively, though not com-
pletely, benign.
Incommensurability claims about the environment present simi-
lar difficulties. Environmental protection is a principle around which
people rally. They make incommensurability claims about the envi-
ronment in order to show their commitment to like-minded people.
Environmental incommensurability claims, unlike ethnic incommen-
surability claims, do not commit the speaker to behavior that directly
harms third parties. The problem with these claims is that, if acted
on, they will indirectly injure third parties-people will be denied
jobs, medicine, and inexpensive food because of restrictions on de-
velopment. I am not arguing that development is necessarily good-I
am arguing that incommensurability claims interfere with efforts to
evaluate development according to its contribution to the welfare of
those affected, and that this interference is not justified by a vindica-
tion of authentic moral values. The interference is, rather, a side ef-
fect of the fact that certain political positions have become symbolic
of a person's trustworthiness within certain groups. Similar com-
ments can be made about incommensurability claims concerning
bodily integrity, including the claims that people should not be per-
mitted to sell their organs, or that women should not be permitted to
bind themselves to surrogacy contracts, whatever the benefit to
them.Y0
The second problem with the simple response-that the govern-
ment should simply ignore or discount incommensurability claims-
is that it is paternalistic. On what grounds should the government ig-
nore the expressed views of its citizens? The answer is that the gov-
ernment should ignore these views when they do not reflect citizens'
39 See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27J.
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1998) (analyzing symbolic behavior).
0 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1937
(1987) (concluding that it is incompatible with "human flourishing" and "our concep-
tion of personhood" to allow some things to be objects of exchange in the market-
place). Although Radin prefers the term "commodification," this term and
"incommensurability" are used interchangeably in the literature.
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interests and values. When citizens make incommensurability claims
in order to avoid reputational penalties, preferences will be con-
cealed, and preference-respecting policies would not reflect citi-
zens' true preferences. 4' Under these circumstances the government
should not defer to expressed preferences.
This is a theory of ideology. An ideology consists of propositions
that people publicly endorse in order to show that they are good
types. Public endorsements of these propositions count as signals of
loyalty because people infer that those who reject these propositions
are bad types. Ideologies are exaggerated and simplified versions of
the world views that people actually hold. The nuance and blurriness
of people's nonideological views about the world disappear in the
ideological version because nuanced positions do not serve well as
signals, whereas extreme positions do. Ideologies are rigid: they rise
suddenly and collapse violently. World views are flexible- they shift
and evolve gradually, often imperceptibly. The rigidity of ideologies
and the discontinuity of ideological change result from the self-
reinforcing nature of signaling equilibria. As long as everyone takes
the public endorsement of certain positions as evidence of loyalty,
people will be reluctant to disagree; but once changes in circum-
stances 'increase or decrease the cost of deviation by a sufficient
42amount, the equilibrium collapses.
This theory can be usefully contrasted with deliberative theories
of preference formation. These theories argue that preferences shift
in valuable ways when exposed to the winds of public debate.3 This
claim is no doubt true, in part. It must also be acknowledged, how-
ever, that preferences can harden when emotions run high; people
take refuge in whatever view emerges as dominant in order to avoid
reputational penalties. People conceal their actual interests and val-
ues because of the importance of signaling, and the signals them-
41 Cf. TIMuR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES 105-17 (1995) (arguing that
"preference falsification is a... reason for the persistance of unwanted social
choices"); Glenn C. Loury, Self-Censorship in Public Discourse, 6 RATIONALIT & Soc'Y
428, 430 (1994) (arguing that the "political correctness" movement has led to "self-
censorship" on the part of those who are afraid of appearing to violate community
norms).
42 See KURAN, supra note 41, at 247-60 (explaining how rapid "unanticipated revolu-
tion[s]" are possible "[w]here the status quo owes its stability to preference, falsifica-
tion").
43 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 20 (1997)
(describing the role of deliberative democracy in the formation of preferences).
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selves are distorted and made extreme by the focal character of abso-
lute statements.
The role of the critic is to identify those popular propositions that
are arbitrary focal points of loyalty and that do not reflect people's
authentic interests. Critical theory seeks to identify distortions in the
political process that undermine political representation. One such
distortion is reflected in the equilibrium that results because people
have strong incentives to signal their desires to enter and enhance re-
lationships with each other. Because people do not want to offend
their partners, they will not make certain criticisms which, if followed,
would make everyone or most people better off. A purpose of critical
theory, then, is to describe conditions under which such an equilib-
rium results, and to criticize the statements and actions that serve as
signals in that equilibrium. Habermas's proposal that we imagine an
ideal conversation in which people are forced to provide honest de-
fenses to any claim they advance is an approach to this problem.4 In
such a conversation, one would have to admit that one supports a par-
ticular policy in order to signal one's loyalty; thus, one's true prefer-
ences would be revealed.
The use of signaling models to disclose ideological distortions in
public debate falls short of the ambitions of Habermas and other
critical theorists. It would not show that any nonreputational prefer-
ences are ethically objectionable. But so ambitious a version of criti-
cal theory runs up against serious conceptual barriers.45 The marriage
of signaling theory and critical theory avoids these problems while
also having a great deal of purchase. Such a theory would allow us to
identify areas of life and politics in which the perceived importance of
signaling one's type overwhelms the incentives to speak or act truth-
fully, resulting in equilibria in which nonreputational preferences are
not satisfied. The critical theorist would have the role of persuading
people that they would be better off if they acted and believed differ-
ently: his or her "imaginative reconstruction" would propose a new
focal point around which behavior would shift.4s Although I cannot
go into detail here, a critical theory along the lines I have suggested
44 SeeJORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1984).
45 See, e.g., RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY (1981).
46 As noted before, reputational concerns distort not only people's claims, but also
people's behavior. This suggests that economists should be skeptical not only of sur-
vey data (a skepticism that is frequently expressed in the literature), but also of market
behavior, when trying to determine preferences.
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could expose the focal character of propositions underlying such ide-
ologies as consumerism, religious fundamentalism, and nationalism.
This leads to the third problem with the simple response that in-
commensurability claims should be ignored by the government.
There is a vast gulf between the normative project of identifying dis-
tortions in people's political views and the political project of forcing
people to change their views. Incommensurability claims present a
political problem. On the one hand, the government cannot take
them seriously, because then it could not make the tradeoffs that gov-
ernments have to make all the time. On the other hand, if the gov-
ernment does not take them seriously, people will press their incom-
mensurability claims against the government-again, as a way of
showing each other that they belong to the good type. This conflict is
played out over and over on the stage of American politics. Econo-
mists, technocrats, and pragmatists trade off, balance, and compro-
mise. Religious figures, moral leaders, and ideologues respond by as-
serting the impossibility of compromise over matters of principle.
Politicians, in turn, are forced to take a position on these issues, as a
way of signaling that they, too, are principled. American politics mir-
rors the conflicts faced by ordinary people: on the surface we see fu-
rious controversies over flag desecration, abortion, gun control, af-
firmative action, and other issues on which all politicians are required
to have a firm and principled position. Beneath the surface we see
frequent compromise-by the same people-over pork, taxes, and
intricate regulatory statutes that lack the national salience of the
other issues.
If you look now at Sunstein's list of the implications of incom-
mensurability for various legal rules and problems, the conceptual
problems that he identifies become less serious. 47 People who take
absolute positions on religion, free speech, and environmental pro-
tection are signaling to relevant communities that they can be trusted.
They take absolute positions, rather than merely strong positions, be-
cause they fear being "outbid" by bad types who claim to be more
deeply committed than they are, and because extreme positions are
more focal than nuanced views.
However, the political problem remains. People will continue
making incommensurability claims because of the pressure to signal
trustworthiness. People will resist attempts by the government to dis-
count incommensurability claims; indeed, politicians and other gov-
17 See supra notes 5-10.
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ernment officials will not want to discount them too much, lest peo-
ple infer that they are bad types. Still, the political problem should
be distinguished from the normative problem. We care about in-
commensurability claims because they inevitably emerge in social life,
but we should not confuse them with deeper values.
CONCLUSION
This Article has not refuted the arguments advanced by philoso-
phers who believe in the incommensurability of values. Instead, it has
shown that the evidence on which they base their arguments-
including certain statements people make, certain choices they make,
and the moral uneasiness they feel about these choices-is suscepti-
ble to another interpretation. On this interpretation, incommensur-
ability claims and other principled claims emerge in an equilibrium
in which rational actors try to show that they are unlikely to cheat in
cooperative endeavors.
This interpretation, if correct, has an important implication: A
government that maximizes social welfare should discount incom-
mensurability claims made by citizens, unless such discounting would
interfere with socially valuable cooperation. 8 More generally, the
welfare-maximizing government should treat with skepticism any
valuations-whether reflected in words or in market behavior-that
reflect ideological commitments, where by "ideology" I mean the
cluster of propositions public endorsement of which serves as a signal
of group loyalty.
The theory presented in this paper says nothing about self-
conception, and perhaps it hollows people out too much. There is a
psychological residuum not explained by the essentially behaviorist
theory that I have described. Objects, as the old idea has it, have both
an intrinsic value and a value that represents their exchangeability for
other, more desirable objects. Thus, we enjoy our houses but with
half a mind toward whether we can trade them up for better houses.
Relationships are similar. One enjoys one's relationships for their in-
trinsic value but also knows that they can be traded for even better re-
lationships: this is what is meant by betrayal. This knowledge makes
us uneasy, because we know that our partners may betray us, and we
43 Cf Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1419 (1998) (assuming that "theories of incommensurability are correct as
far as individual decisions are concerned," but finding that as applied to governmental
decisions, those theories are untenable).
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know that they know that we may betray them. Our trust and distrust
drive us endlessly to provide evidence of our good faith, and to regard
theirs with skepticism. No doubt this tension existed in societies that
did not have money, but the invention and spread of money must
have increased the tension, simply because money-"the most certain
image and the clearest embodiment of the formula of all being, ac-
cording to which things receive their meaning through each other,"
in Simmel's words 49 -decreases the cost of betrayal by facilitating the
comparison of options. Incommensurability claims, which are just a
denial that such comparison is made easily or routinely and in the ab-
sence of consideration of the intrinsic value of the options, emerge
not only in the social and commercial games that we play with others,
but in the psychological games that we play with ourselves.
49 SIMMEL, supra note 1, at 128-29.
